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IV.

INTRODUCTION

Whistleblowing occurs when an employee attempts to
"blow the whistle"1 and expose a wrongdoing within a
Whistleblowing may occur
corporation or organization. 2
internally, when an employee contacts a manager or a
supervisor, or externally, when an employee reports to a
government agency or media representative. 3 The public has
deemed some whistleblowers the "voices of reason" who act to
protect the public. 4 Though a few whistleblowers succeed in
identifying and stopping fraud, most employees with personal
knowledge of corruption fail to report the information, and
the fraud remains undiscovered. 5 To promote whistleblowing
to the government, several federal statutes incorporate
incentives,
for
provisions,
or
monetary
"bounty"
6
Many
whistleblowers to report valuable information.
employees compare the monetary incentives to the risk of
retaliation by co-workers and employers who brand the
whistleblower a snitch, an informer, or worse, a traitor. In
order to protect whistleblowers from such reprisals, statutes
often contain retaliation provisions that forbid employers
1. An employee "blows the whistle" by alerting the corporation or the
government of the potential wrongdoing. Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector
Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A Comparative Legal,
Ethical, and PragmaticAnalysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment
Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1052 (2004).
5. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117 (2006).
6. Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The
Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs,1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1141, 1143-44 (1999). Four federal bounty programs exist: the SEC, the
IRS, the U.S. Customs Service, and the False Claims Act. See id. at 1144.
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from firing employees for whistleblowing.7
In a promise to "clean up" the financial services industry
and the prevalent fraud, President Obama signed the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010.8 The Dodd-Frank Act provides
monetary incentives for whistleblowers who report fraudulent
corporate practices to the government. 9 Yet eight years prior,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to decrease
fraudulent activities by requiring corporations to construct
internal reporting mechanisms. 10 Congress designed these
mechanisms to encourage employees to report fraud and
promote corporate self-regulation. 1
Corporations are still
required to maintain the internal reporting mechanisms and
compliance programs required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
even though the monetary incentives provided by the DoddFrank Act undermine the purpose of such programs. 1 2 For
example, a public accountant for a major corporation may
discover information that implicates a manager in an act of
fraud. On one hand, the accountant may report to the
company and risk retaliation.
On the other hand, the
accountant could report to the government for a substantial
reward and receive protection for their whistleblowing
activities.
As of 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has not granted a whistleblower award under the
Dodd-Frank Act.' 3 However, the recent $96 million dollar
award to Cheryl Eckard under a similar whistleblower
provision, the False Claims Act, exasperated corporate

7. Cherry, supra note 4, at 1049.
8. Kevin Griffith, Whistleblowing Galore Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
BANKING & FINANCE LAW REPORT (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.bankingand

financelawreport.com/2010/08/articles/bank-regulation/whistleblowing-galoreunder-the-doddfrank-act/.
9. Id.
10. Moberly, supra note 5.
11. Id.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010)).
12. Moberly, supra note 5; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
§ 806, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010)).
13. SEC, ANN. REP. ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 6 (Oct. 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/whistleblower-report-to-congress.pdf
[hereinafter SEC REPORT]. No whistleblower awards have been paid from the
$451 million dollars in the Fund created to finance the SEC's whistleblower
award program. Id.
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concern of the potential impact created by external
at
Eckard, a manager
awards. 4
whistleblowing
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), 15 informed the government of her
employer's compliance violations. 16 Prior to informing the
government, Eckard reported the violations to GSK for a
period of ten months, and continued to do so even after GSK
fired her; only when internal complaints failed did Ms.
Eckard turn to the government.1 7 Eckard may not have been
motivated by monetary incentives to report the fraudulent
activity to the government. However, other employees in a
similar situation may bypass internal reporting procedures,
and corporations may lose the chance to remedy compliance
violations prior to government involvement.18 In light of the
publicity created by Eckard's award and the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act, corporations may benefit from creating a
more effective compliance program that will prevail over the
financial incentives enticing employees to disregard internal
programs.19
In response to this difficult challenge, many employers
attempt to educate their employees about legal regulations or
Ballgame: Dodd-Frank's
New
A
Whole
Levick,
14. Richard
Whistleblower Provisions, LEVICK (Nov. 2, 2010) http://www.levick.com/
index.php?id=910&type=articles&item id=230&action=showitem.
15. GlaxoSmithKline is a pharmaceutical company. Ashby Jones, The Story
Behind the $96M Whistleblowing Recovery, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Oct. 28,
2010, 10:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/28/the-story-behind-the-96mwhistleblowing-recovery/.
16. Id. Eckard discovered several problems at a GSK plant located in Cidra,
Puerto Rico. Kristine B., Whistleblower Lawsuit Pays Off Big for Former GSK
Employee, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM THE BLOG (Nov. 22, 2010),
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/blog/whistleblower-lawsuit-pays-off-bigfor-former-gsk-employee-05772.html. Eckard suggested that GSK notify the
FDA about product problems in the plant, such as drugs of different types being
mixed into the same bottle and medications contaminated with bacteria. Id.;
Glaxo Whistle-Blower Lawsuit: Bad Medicine, CBSNEWS (Jan. 7, 2011, 12:36
71 9 52 4 7
.
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/29/60minutes/main
PM),
shtml. After Eckard filed a qui tam claim against GSK, GSK agreed to pay
$750 million to settle charges of placing adulterated drugs onto the market and
$600 million to settle claims under the False Claims Act. Id.; Michael Connor,
GSK to Pay $750 Million Fine: Whistleblower to Get $96 Million, BUSINESS
http://business-ethics.com/2010/10/ 2 6/17402010),
26,
(Oct.
ETHics
glaxosmithkline-to-pay-750-million-fine-whistleblower-to-get-96-million/.
Quality Assurance Manager Rewarded for
Rickman,
17. Gene
Whistleblowing, TOPNEWS (Oct. 28, 2010, 7:59 AM), http://topnews.co.uk/
215477-quality-assurance-manager-rewarded-whistleblowing.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part IV.
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A company's
ethical standards within the company.
compliance and ethics program informs employees of the
corporation's "code(s) of conduct, policies, and procedures
designed to achieve compliance with applicable legal
regulations and internal ethical standards." 2
This
compliance program must effectively deter and detect
violations with the use of risk assessments, auditing, and
appropriate discipline.2 2 Employees, more than corporate
monitors, have a better understanding of the "inner
workings" of the corporation and may know about fraudulent
activities within the corporation. 23 Usually corporate officials
assign mid-level managers to handle the dirty work involved
in fraud.2 4 In fact, a paper trail leading to the corporate
official may not exist, and without the help of the insider, the
mid-level managers will be the "scapegoats," while the
higher-ranked
initiator
remains
undiscovered
and
unpunished.2 5 As whistleblowers have disclosed roughly onethird of fraudulent crimes against businesses, encouraging
employees to become internal whistleblowers is an essential
step towards preventing fraud.26 However, these compliance
programs may not be able to compete with the substantial
monetary incentives provided by the Dodd-Frank Act.
This Comment will explore the possible effects of the
Dodd-Frank Act on corporate compliance programs
established after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Part I will provide
an introduction to the history of whistleblower provisions,
ultimately focusing on the internal reporting requirements of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the later implementation of
corporate compliance programs.2 7 Part II will explore the
problems the Dodd-Frank Act may create for corporate
compliance programs.2" An analysis of whether the DoddFrank Act may successfully entice employees to blow the

20. Corporate Compliance Committee, Corporate Compliance Survey, 60
Bus. LAw. 1759, 1759 (2005) [hereinafter CorporateCompliance Survey].
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. See Moberly, supra note 5, at 1116.
24. See Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and
Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L. REV. 357, 374 (2003).

25. Id. at 374-75.
26. Moberly, supra note 5.
27. See infra Part I.
28. See infra Part II.
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whistle externally will follow in Part 111.29 It will include an
examination of the significance and complexity of the DoddFrank Act incentives and the retaliation protections provided
to whistleblowers.3 0
Further, Part III will consider the
results of other whistleblower statutes and the potential
success of the Dodd-Frank Act. 31 Lastly, Part IV will suggest
modifications to compliance programs that will encourage
internal whistleblowing in response to the Dodd-Frank Act.32
I. BACKGROUND

As far back as the Civil War era, the federal government
enacted statutes-such as the False Claims Act (FCA), the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Informant's Claims Program,
and the Insider Trading and Securities Enforcement Act of
1988 (Insider Trading Act)-to increase whistleblowing
through monetary incentives and retaliation protections for33
reporting valuable information to government agencies.
Congress limited each whistleblowing statute to a specific
purpose: in 1863, the FCA deterred government military
suppliers from presenting false claims to the government; 34 in
1867, the IRS Informant's Claims Program provided
guaranteed incentives for whistleblowers who alerted the IRS
of compliance violations;3 5 in 1988, the Insider Trading Act
empowered the SEC to award a bounty when civil penalties
While external
were recovered from an insider-trader.3 6
29.
30.
31.
32.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

III.
III.A-B.
III.C-D.
IV.

33. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2011); INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE,
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY,
1
&
n.1
(2008),
available at

http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/whistleblowerannual report.pdf;
SEC,
Office of the Inspector Gen., Office of Audits, Assessment of SEC Bounty
Program:Executive Summary, 1 (2010) [hereinafter SEC Executive Summary],
available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/Auditslnspections/2010/474.pdf;
Robin Page West, Qui Tam Litigation, 28 LITIG. 21, 21 (2001).
34. West, supra note 33.
35. Fiscal Year 2010 Report to the Congress on the use of Section 7623, 1
(2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/whistleblowerfy09rtc.pdf.
The act was modified in 2006 to require the IRS to award whistleblowers who
provided information that "substantially contribute[d] to the collection of tax,
penalties, interest, and other amounts when the amounts in dispute are more
than $2 million." Id.
36. SEC Executive Summary, supra note 33. The Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 added Section 21A(e) to the

HeinOnline -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 260 2012

2012]

WHISTLEBLOWER TUG-OF-WAR

whistleblower awards are not a novel concept in the United
States, many corporations have begun to encourage internal
reporting requirements.17 Internal reporting allows the
corporation to ascertain potential problems, report necessary
violations to the government, and receive sentencing benefits
However, these internal reporting
for their disclosures. 3
programs may be in jeopardy, as the Dodd-Frank Act
awards
persuading
authorizes
significant
monetary
employees to report to the government.3 9 This leaves the
corporation with little opportunity to discover the problem,
report the violation to the local authorities, and receive
sentencing credits.4 °
A.

The Sarbanes-OxleyAct

In 2002, President George W. Bush signed the Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act,
also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.4 1
This
groundbreaking act incorporated whistleblower protections
into the Securities Exchange Act of 193442 and provided the
first civil remedy for public company employees who blew the
whistle about fraudulent activities-a protection traditionally
limited to private sector employees reporting health and
public safety violations. 43 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act broke
through the "conceptual barrier" that previously limited the
scope and impact of public policy to the private sector and

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, effectively authorizing the SEC to grant
awards to whistleblowers who provided information on insider-trading. Id.
Insider-trading "refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of
fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust or confidence, while in possession of
material, nonpublic information about the security. Id. at 1 n.1.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See infra Part I.A.
39. See infra Part II.
40. Id.
41. ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK

2008, at 876 (Timothy J. Long ed., Practising Law Inst. 2008) [hereinafter
EMPLOYMENT LAW YEARBOOK].

42. See id.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116
Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 1514A (2010)). The Act was enacted
on July 30, 2002 in an attempt to restore confidence in corporate financial
wrongdoings after several highly publicized cases.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
YEARBOOK, supra note 41, at 876-77 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S6439-40, 107th
Cong. (2002)).
43. Daniel P. Westman, The Significance of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Whistleblower Provisions, 21 LAB. LAW. 141, 142 (2005).
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expanded protections to a contemporary public concern:
fraud.4 4 Additionally, the Act significantly altered internal
reporting mechanisms by improving the legitimacy of internal
disclosures through implemented procedures and providing
sentencing benefits for embracing an effective reporting
program.45
In order to ensure that corporate executives report to the
board of directors and maintain "open and effective channels
of information," 46 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act demands that
corporations: "(1) establish internal controls and procedures;
(2) certify their completeness and quality; (3) file an internal
controls report; and (4) have external auditors attest to the
The Act also
adequacy of internal control systems."4 7
requires that each corporate audit committee retain all
These
complaints and ensure anonymous submission. 4
requirements make certain that management will not dismiss
anonymous complaints4 9 and that the audit committee
documents and verifies the effectiveness of internal
procedures.50
If the corporation fails to implement internal procedures
required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the national securities
5 2 will
exchanges 5' and the national securities associations
44. Id.
45. Moberly, supra note 5, at 1139.
46. Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68
MD. L. REV. 786, 840 (2009) (hereinafter Whistleblowing Attorneys].
47. John F. Kros & Scott S. Nadler, The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Off-Balance Sheet Supply Chain Activities, BNET.COM (2010), http://fmdarticles.
comlp/articles/mi-qa3705/is_201001ai n53508823/pg_1/?tag=content;coll.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(B) (2010)).
49. Westman, supra note 43, at 149.
50. Kros & Nadler, supra note 47.
51. A national securities exchange is a securities exchange that has
registered with the SEC. There are fifteen securities exchanges currently
registered with the SEC: NYSE Amex L.L.C., BATS Exchange, Inc., BATS YExchange, Inc., NASDAQ OMX BX, Inc., C2 Options Exchange, Inc., Chicago
Board Options Exchange Inc., EDGA Exchange, Inc., EDGX Exchange, Inc.,
International Securities Exchange, L.L.C., The Nasdaq Stock Market L.L.C.,
National Stock Exchange, Inc., New York Stock Exchange L.L.C., NYSE Arca,
Inc., and NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. SEC, Exchanges, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N,
httpJ/www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml (last modified July
26, 2011).
52. National security associations represent private security companies and
are designed to monitor any state and federal legislation or regulations that
may affect the quality and effectiveness of private security services. See
About
Nasco,
of
Security
Companies,
National
Association

HeinOnline -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 262 2012

20121

WHISTLEBLOWER TUG-OF-WAR

refuse to list the securities of the corporation.5 3 Further,
several amendments to the United States Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines-which govern the imposition of
sentences by Federal Judges on organizational defendantsencourages ethical conduct and conformity, by reducing
federal criminal penalties for violations if the corporation
took reasonable steps to ensure an effective, publicized
compliance program.5 4 The board of directors must acquaint
itself with the compliance program. The Act entrusted the
board with the responsibility of examining annual reports
from a high-level employee, such as a compliance director,
who is responsible for the compliance and ethics program.5 5
While critics claim that expanding internal whistleblower
programs created an incentive for corporations to hide
information from the public to protect the company's
reputation and avoid negative publicity, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act sanctions corporate monitors if they refuse to disclose
violations to the SEC.56
Congress intended to intensify safeguards for employees,
shareholders, and consumers by forcing corporations to
establish a valid corporate compliance program with
Through the
successful internal reporting procedures. 57
requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a compliance
program should encourage the free flow of information
throughout the corporation, without the fear of retaliation
B. Internal Reporting Proceduresof Compliance Programs
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many corporate
compliance programs required reports to ascend through the

http://www.nasco.org/about-nasco.
53. Whistleblowing Attorneys, supra note 46, at 840-41, citing SarbanesOxley Act, § 301 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m)(A) (2010)).
54. Id. at 840-41 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 8B2.1(a) (2010)). Under the United
States Organizational Sentencing Guidelines criminal sanctions imposed on
organizations differ from sentences imposed on individuals. 18 U.S.C. Appx
prec. § 8A1.1 The sentencing guidelines provided for organizations imposes
sanctions on the organization to provide "just punishment, adequate deterrence,
and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanisms for

preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct." Id.
55. Moberly, supra note 5, at 1149-50.
56. Id. at 1151.
57. Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting
CorporateWhistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2005).
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corporate management hierarchy. 5 While some corporations
had ethics hotlines, employees often refused to challenge the
managers engaged in fraud because there were few or no
protections from retaliation.5 9 Further, if an employee did
blow the whistle, he may have been reporting the misconduct
to a non-responsive, biased, or corrupt manager.6 °
"Ineffective and unsupported disclosure channels failed to
encourage employees to become whistleblowers and, if
employees did blow the whistle, their disclosures rarely
reached parties willing and able to address them."6 '
Following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
corporations implemented or re-modeled their internal
A
A
reporting mechanisms and compliance programs. 62
productive,
successful internal
reporting mechanism
encourages participation through several essential factors:
effective communication
with employees
about the
importance of internal procedures, anonymous reporting, and
reduction of the disadvantages of whistleblowing. 6
An
effective program will persuade dedicated, loyal employees to
report internally.64
To protect internal reporting, some
corporations hire private parties that specialize in
constructing
anonymous
hotlines
for
whistleblowers
concerned about their anonymity.65 These third parties, such
as EthicsPoint or International Ombudsman Association,
provide hotlines, web-based reporting, and case management
services. 66 For example, KPMG, an international corporation
offering audit, tax and advisory services, hired EthicsPoint to
ensure confidentiality and anonymity within its compliance

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Whistleblowing Attorneys, supra note 46, at 840-41.
Cherry, supra note 4.
Moberly, supra note 5, at 1135.
Id. at 1138.
Kros & Nadler, supra note 47.
Moberly, supra note 5, at 1142-43; Telephone Interview with Tim

Mazur, Chief Operating Officer, Ethics & Compliance Officer Association (Nov.
11, 2010).
64. Moberly, supra note 5, at 1143.
65. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
66. About
Us,
ETHICS
POINT,
http://www.ethicspoint.com/about-

us/default.aspx, (last visited Dec. 27, 2010); JEFFREY M. KAPLAN & JOSEPH E.
MURPHY,

COMPLIANCE

PROGRAMS

AND

THE

CORPORATE

GUIDELINES: PREVENTING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY,

West rev. ed. 2007).
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program. 67 When these third parties receive allegations of
misconduct, they must report the violation to the corporate
compliance officer, who in turn reports it to the SEC. 68
In order to ensure that the corporate compliance program
operates effectively, a compliance officer should be a true,
trusted, respected officer who is able to create procedural
changes and perform investigations through unrestricted
access to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the board of
directors.6 9 Corporate ethics officers are designed to give
employees an avenue to report wrongdoings without fear of
retribution.7 °
Many corporations combine ethics and
compliance programs because a "compliance program that
incorporates ethical concerns is, in fact, more likely to
anticipate changes in the law and [effectively] prevent
borderline violations of legal requirements."7 1 Regardless of a
corporation's program design, the compliance officer is
responsible for reporting compliance issues to the CEO.7"
Some critics argue this procedural requirement permits the
CEO to improperly influence the officer's fact-finding and
investigations.7 3 Thus, when accepting the position, many
compliance officers take an oath to uphold their
responsibilities. 74 However, this procedure cannot ensure
that compliance officers will not be influenced by the
individuals who hired them.
Internal investigations are traditionally conducted when
a violation is discovered or when the SEC informs the
67. Answers to your questions about the Ethics and Compliance Hotline,
KPMG ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HOTLINE, https://secure.ethicspoint.com
domain/medialen/guil1093/additional.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
68. In re Monsanto Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 50978 (Jan. 6,
2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50978.htm.
69. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 64, at 9-2 to 9-5. He must be "highlevel" personnel within the organization such as, a director, an executive officer,
a party with substantial ownership interest, or an individual with significant
responsibility within the company. Id.
70. Id. at 9-17 to 9-18.
71. Id. Unfortunately approximately forty percent of compliance officers
report directly to the board of directors, the CEO, or the company president. Dr.
John D. Copeland, The Tyson Story: Building an Effective Ethics and
Compliance Program, 5 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 305, 310 (2000). Thus, the board of
directors or CEO's influence may cause the compliance officer to reveal the
employee's name and subject him to possible retaliation. See infra Part IV.C.
72. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 66, at 9-44 to 9-46.

73. Id. at 14-37.
74. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
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corporation that the corporation is the subject of a federal
investigation. 7 1 Typical violations that invoke government
scrutiny include "misrepresent[ing] or [omitting] important
information about securities; manipulating the market prices
of securities; stealing customers' funds or securities; violating
broker-dealers' responsibility to treat customers fairly;
76
insider trading; . . .and selling unregistered securities." If
the misconduct is minor, the corporation will likely use inhouse counsel who are more familiar with the company;
however, in complex issues, the company should use outside
counsel. 77 "Serious conflicts of interest" arise when a firm
engaged in a violation also participates in the resulting
The "Best Practice" guide, suggested by the
investigation.
Conference Board's Commission on Public Trust and Private
Enterprise, concluded that "special counsel retained to
conduct independent investigations with likelihood to
implicate company executives ...should not be an individual
or a firm that the company regularly uses as outside counsel
or that derives a material amount of revenues from the
79
company."
While the prices for internal investigations can be
exorbitant, they outweigh the cost of failing to investigate
because the corporation will not receive a sentencing break
and may incur more damages by the ongoing fraud. 0 If the
corporation discovers that misconduct did not transpire,
disclosure to the SEC is unnecessary; however, when8 a
violation occurs, the corporation must report it to the SEC 1 if
the violation involves "information, whether it is positive or
negative, that might be relevant to an investor's decision to

75. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 65, at 15-4.
76. The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/aboutlwhatwedo.shtml (last modified Oct. 24, 2011)
[hereinafter Investor's Advocate].
77. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 66, at 15-13.
78. In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig. v. Enron Corp., 235 F.
Supp. 2d 549, 668 n.103 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
79.

THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE

ENTERPRISE, 33 (2003), available at http'//www.conference-board.org/pdf free

/SR-03-04.pdf. Lawyers and law firms are best at conducting investigations, as
they are thorough and objective. Id. at 32.
80. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 66, at 15-11.
81. Id. at 15-32.
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buy, sell, or hold the security."8 2 If the corporation fails to
report material information, the SEC will bring a civil
enforcement action against the corporation. 3 Regulations
also require corporations to disclose any crucial legal or
administrative proceedings and other items that may have a
reasonable impact on the corporation's productivity. 4
Although the law demands these disclosures, the sentencing
guidelines also function to motivate corporations to divulge
information by reducing their sanction. 85
"Ethics and compliance rank highly among the
characteristics needed in today's corporations, and a proper
system for internal whistleblowing is vital to those causes. 8 6
Internal compliance programs allow corporations to address
concerns internally and receive sentencing credit for selfreporting any legal violations.8 7 In order for the SarbanesOxley Act to be successful in decreasing the public's concern
for corporate fraud, corporations need to successfully
implement and enforce internal reporting procedures that can
identify misconduct. In turn, corporations benefit from the
implementation of such programs; they identify wrongdoings,
decrease negative media, and take advantage of sentencing
breaks when a violation does occur.
C. The Dodd-FrankAct
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act to
increase the accountability of the financial system, to ensure
financial stability, and to decrease bailouts to protect
American taxpayers and consumers.88 The Act made several
82. Investor's Advocate, supra note 76.
83. Id.
84. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the TwentyFirst Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV.
775, 809 (2004) (citing 17 C.F.R §§ 229.10, 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2006)).
85. Moberly, supra note 5, at 1139.
86. Penny Crosman, Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions Could Hamper
Banks' Compliance Efforts, NACD Claims, BANK SYSS. & TECH. (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://www.banktech.com/blogs/228800977 (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act's
impact on encouraging employees to bypass banks' compliance departments and
inform the SEC of fraudulent activity); see 18 U.S.C. § 8B2.1 (2011).
87. Adele Nicholas, Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Pressure Employers to Improve Compliance, INSIDE COUNSEL (Oct. 2010),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2010/October-2010/PagesWhistleblowerprovisions-of-the-DoddFrank-Act-pressure-employers-to-improvecompliance.aspx.
88. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
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amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
originally established the SEC and provided regulations for
financial markets.8 9 In order to increase the SEC's regulatory
capacity, the Dodd-Frank Act provides significant monetary
incentives and retaliation protections for employees who
report fraudulent activities to the government. 90 As the
Dodd-Frank Act focuses purely on the SEC, the Act applies to
whistleblowers who provide "information relating to a
violation of the securities law,"91 or who initiate, testify, or
If
assist in an SEC investigation or judicial action. 92
retaliation
and
Act
incentive
the
Dodd-Frank
successful,
provisions will have a unique and potentially detrimental
effect on the compliance programs created in conformity with
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As the SEC has not yet granted a
Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower award, the possible effects of
the act are unknown. 93
II. THE DODD-FRANK ACT COMPETES WITH INTERNAL
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
The SEC specifically states "[t]he [SEC] Commission
does not intend for its rules to undermine effective
company processes for receiving reports on potential
violations . . . ,,9 including compliance programs created
after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Dodd-Frank Act adversely
encourages whistleblowers to report to the government,
instead of the corporation, by increasing monetary incentives
95
and strengthening the protections provided to employees.
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
89. Id.; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(1934). The Securities Exchange Act imposes reporting requirements on
corporations who are listed in the national securities exchanges, Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), to implement a philosophy of full disclosure
and an honest market. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
90. Griffith, supra note 8.
91. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6)
(2010)).
92. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2010)).
93. SEC REPORT, supra note 13.
94. Proposed Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No.
34-63237, 75 Fed. Reg. 70,488, 70,496 (Nov. 17, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240, 249) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rules].
95. Douglas Y. Park, Whistleblower Provisions of Dodd-Frank Worry
Companies, DYP ADVISORS (NOV. 16, 2010), http://www.dypadvisors.com/
see also
2010/11]16/whistbleblowing-provisions-dodd-frank-worry-companies;
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This decreases the effectiveness of compliance programs by
reducing the number of employees willing to utilize internal
reporting mechanisms.9"
The Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer at Allstate
Insurance Co. argued that the Dodd-Frank Act incentives
directly conflict with the internal programs implemented with
the Sarbanes-Oxley law, as employees will "flee" to the
federal government instead of reporting misconduct to the
corporation. 9v Similarly, David Hirschmann, of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, declared that the Dodd-Frank Act
will essentially "eviscerate" corporate compliance programs. 9
Kenneth Grady, general counsel at Wolverine World Wide,
Inc., claimed that employees are no longer contemplating the
option of internal whistleblowing, and asked "which do you
think is going to win-an internal whistleblower program
that relies on truth or one that offers a huge financial
bounty?" 99 McDonald's, Delta Air Lines, and GSK, as well as
many other companies, criticize the Dodd-Frank Act for
damaging their internal compliance programs. 100 Prior to the
enactment of the SEC's rules under the Dodd-Frank Act, SEC
Commissioner Troy Paredes admitted that the proposed rules
"might not do enough to preserve the important role that
corporate compliance programs serve.
It would be
unfortunate if, as a result of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower
program, effective corporate compliance programs were
thwarted."'0 '
After the enactment of the SEC's rules,
Commissioner Paredes noted that the SEC could have created
more stringent rules to ensure that employees would use
Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1), 78u6(h)(1)(A) (2010)).
96. Park, supra note 95.
97. Ashby Jones & Joann S. Lublin, CriticsBlow the Whistle on Law, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 1, 2010, at B1.
98. David Hirshmann, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Nov. 3, 2010,
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/press/releases/2010/november/uschamber-urges-sec-consider-potential-consequences-whistleblower-boun.
99. Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at Bll.
100. Tim Human, Whistleblower Rule Sets Alarm Bells Ringing, BUSINESS
INSIDER (January 26, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.comlwhistleblowerrule-sets-alarm-bells-ringing-2011-1.
101. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r of Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Statement at Open
Meeting to Propose Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Nov. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch 1l03lOtap-whistleblowers.htm
(last
modified Nov. 3, 2010).
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internal reporting requirements. 10 2
SEC Commissioner
Kathleen Casey stated that the SEC has "underestimated
the
103
negative impact on internal compliance programs."
Though it encourages external whistleblowing, the DoddFrank Act does not specifically prohibit an employee from
internal whistleblowing; in fact, the SEC will not disqualify
internal whistleblowers from receiving awards, so long as
they report to the SEC within ninety days of the violation. 104
Additionally, an SEC rule allows the Commission to consider
a whistleblower's internal reporting attempts when
determining the amount of the award. 10 5 Corporate lawyers
argue that the SEC should do more than support internal
whistleblowing, by requiring employees to report internally
before the SEC will investigate.'0 6 Merely considering a
102. SEC OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/
owb/owb-faq.shtml#P27_7623 [hereinafter OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER]
(statement of Commissioner Troy Paredes). Commissioner Paredes suggested
two SEC rules that, if enacted, would have promoted internal reporting
mechanisms without discouraging whistleblowing to the SEC: (1) require
employees report the same information provided to the SEC to their employer,
and (2) change the language of the SEC rules to require that the SEC consider
the employees internal reporting choices (instead of the current language which
allows the SEC to simply consider the employee's decisions). Id.
103. Id. (statement of Commissioner Kathleen Casey). Commissioner Casey
was concerned that the new whistleblower incentives were significant enough to
encourage employees to "bypass" internal reporting requirements. Id.
104. Kelly Eggers, New
Whistleblower Rules: Are Your Workers
Government-Sponsored Moles, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2010, 6:55 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/11/04/new-whistleblower-rules-are-yourworkers-government-sponsored-moles/?KEYWORDS=whistleblowing.
See also
SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 94.
105. See SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 94, at 32-33. The SEC claims that
it will consider whether the employee participated in internal compliance
programs or attempted to hinder such programs when determining the amount
of the award. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 102. Commissioner
Troy Paredes also stated that the SEC may consider an employees use of an
internal reporting requirement when determining the award; the SEC rules do
not require the SEC to consider such internal reporting. Id. (statement by
Commissioner Troy Paredes).
106. Jessica Holzer & Ashby Jones, SEC ProposedRules for Bounties, WALL.
ST. J., B4, (Nov. 4, 2010) (statement by Steven Pearlman, a corporate defense
lawyer at Seyfarth Shaw L.L.P.). See Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at Bll
(statement made by Kenneth Daly, the President of the National Association of
Directors). Tim Mazur also suggests that the SEC should require employees to
first use internal procedures; however, in order to safeguard employees from
retaliation, he proposes that the SEC provide an exception for employees who
can prove that a reasonable person would not have felt comfortable reporting
through internal procedures. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note
63.
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whistleblower's attempt to report internally is not sufficient
to sustain compliance programs, as it leaves the corporation
with no power to enforce internal reporting.,O
If the Dodd-Frank Act successfully entices employees to
report externally, the Act will force corporations to finance
compliance programs required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
with no ability to compete with the significant financial
incentives offered by the Dodd-Frank Act. 108 The sentencing
benefits provided to self-reporting corporations with effective
compliance programs are insignificant, as corporations will
lack the ability to attain the requisite information about the
violation from the employee.10 9 As the employee weighs the
benefits and disadvantages of reporting externally, an
employer faced with a potential violation may report to the
government prematurely in an attempt to gain sentencing
benefits.1 10 If the corporation has not completed a thorough
investigation, the employer is inviting the government to
examine the company even when a securities law violation
did not occur. "I
In order to remove unexpected, extraneous government
involvement and compete with external monetary awards,
corporations must create an internal compliance program
that is more enticing than the uncertainty and complexity of
receiving an award through the Dodd-Frank Act." 2 Yet this
presents the proverbial tug-of-war, where the federal
government and corporations compete for the employee's
To succeed and receive
loyalty in their disclosures.
sentencing benefits, compliance programs must persuade
employees to report internally, maintaining the corporation's
investigation and to self-report
ability to conduct a thorough
11 3
any discovered violations.

107. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
108. See Park, supra note 95.
109. See Moberly, supra note 5, at 1134 ("Under the [Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines], penalties for corporations convicted of crimes could be
reduced by up to ninety-five percent if the corporation previously implemented
0 a program" aimed at preventing and detecting violations of law).
110. See Nicholas, supra note 87.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Lisa Kuca & Christopher A. Myers, Corporate Compliance & Ethics
Programs: A New Generation U.S. Sentencing Commission Tightens the
Requirements for Effective Programs,19 COMM. ON CORP. COUNS. 22 (2005).
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT
Corporations will only face an employee "tug-of-war" if
the Dodd-Frank Act is successful at enticing employees to
report to the SEC. If the possibility of a monetary award is
too remote or the retaliation provisions are too narrow, an
employee may feel more comfortable with an easy, selfexplanatory corporate compliance program. However, if the
Dodd-Frank Act successfully provides awards, the chain
reaction could escalate the number of employees comfortable
with whistleblowing to the SEC. In tough economic times,
when employees fear losing their jobs, the effect of retaliation
provisions is also essential to understanding an employee's
willingness to betray the corporation and subject it to
Finally, an evaluation of the
government involvement.
success of past federal statutes 114 and the potential success of
the
the Dodd-Frank Act is necessary to understanding
5
11
programs.
compliance
on
impact
potential
A. Whistleblower Incentives
A few statutes have recognized bounty provisions 1 6 for
whistleblowers.1 7
The Dodd-Frank Act is structurally
similar to some of these provisions, but there are some major
innovations that will affect the application and success of
whistleblower awards."'
Several factors are necessary to
determine the potential of the Act based on the extent of the
awards provided to potential whistleblower: (1) the scope of
the statute, (2) the conditions necessary to qualify for a
whistleblower award, (3) the certainty and the source of
receiving an award, (4) the amount of the award and
discretion of the agency, and (5) the anonymity of the
whistleblower. 1 9
114. See infra Part III.C.
115. See infra Part III.D.
116. Bounty provisions are monetary incentives paid by the federal
government to individuals who provide tips relating to the government's
regulatory or law enforcement efforts. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at
1141.
117. Id. at 1144.
118. Id. at 1145-46.
119. See id. at 1145. These five factors were created from an analysis of
bounty programs in the Securities Exchange Commission, the IRS, the U.S.
Customs Service, and the False Claims Act. Id. at 1144-45. For this Comment,
two factors, the certainty of the bounty and the source of the bounty have been
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1. Scope of the Statute
The Dodd-Frank Act applies to whistleblowers who
provide "information relating to a violation of the securities
law," 2 ° or who initiate, testify, or assist in an investigation or
judicial action.121 Some professionals believe the impact of
the Dodd-Frank Act will be minimal because whistleblower
provisions are only triggered when a publicly-traded company
is involved.' 22 In comparison, the successful FCA originally
allowed anyone, including government employees, to bring
qui tam actions-actions brought by the employee in the
interest of the public-for false claims committed by an
individual or a company.'2 3 The Dodd-Frank Act does not
include a similar qui tam provision and limits the type of
individuals who qualify for an award, as the SEC will not
award whistleblowers who obtain information while a
"member, officer or employee of-(i) an appropriate
regulatory agency; (ii) the Department of Justice; (iii) a selfregulatory organization; (iv) the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board; or (v) a law enforcement organization."'2 4
combined into one factor. See id. at 1145.
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922(a) (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §78u-6(a)(6) (2010)).
121. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2010)).
122. Kevin LaCroix, Developments Worth Watching on the Anti-Corruption
Front, THE D&O DIARY (July 22, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2010/07/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/developments-worth-watching-onthe-anticorruption-front/. Typically only public company employees will have
the knowledge to engage in whistleblowing. Id.
123. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (2011). "Qui tam" is a Latin term
for those "who pursues this action on our Lord or King's behalf as well as his
own" and allows citizens to sue on behalf of the government. West, supra note
33. The FCA originally allowed anyone, including government employees to
bring qui tam actions, actions brought only by the plaintiff in the interest of the
public. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a). This created duplicate actions when both the
government brought criminal claims and the government employee brought qui
tam civil claims against the defendant. See West, supra note 33. It was later
amended to allow a qui tam plaintiff to remain a party to the action and receive
an award even if the government intervened. Id. When the government was
involved in the action, only .4% of the claims were dismissed; however, 80% of
the claims filed as qui tam actions, in which the government declined to
intervene, were dismissed. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Pub.
Affairs, Justice Department Recovers $2.4 Billion in False Claims Cases in
Fiscal Year 2009; More Than $24 Billion Since 1986, Release No. 09-1253 (Nov.
19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-civ1253.html [hereinafter FCA Claims].
124. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78u-
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Since employees with a duty to report violations to their
agency will not receive whistleblower awards, the DoddFrank Act deters federal employees from using their official
capacity for personal gain. 125 The Dodd-Frank Act also denies
awards to individuals convicted of a crime related to the
violation, but it does not specifically reject awards for
individuals simply involved with the violation. 126
The statutory language as to who qualifies for an award
The whistleblower must have
is straightforward. 12 7
information relating to a securities law violation and may not
be an employee of specific securities agencies or law
Therefore, the act does not
enforcement agencies. 121
significantly limit employees of publicly-traded companies
from receiving an award if they have sufficient information to
report to the SEC regarding a securities law violation.
2.

Sufficient Information

In order to recover an award under the Dodd-Frank Act
the whistleblower must provide original information to the
SEC.' 2 9 This provision is more restrictive than the FCA,
which does not require the whistleblower to provide original
information-it only requires the whistleblower to be the

6(c)(2)(A) (2010)).
125. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1147.
126. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(b)(2)(B) (2010)). In comparison, the Tax Relief Act decreases an award if the

whistleblower initiated or planned actions that led to the violation or
underpayment, while the FCA and the Tax Relief Act require that an award be
denied to any whistleblower charged with a crime in connection with the
violation. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (2011); Tax Relief and

Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, 120 Stat. 2922, (2006) (codified as
amended at 26 USC § 7623(b)(1) (2006)). The Insider Trading Act does not
contain a provision denying payment to anyone involved or convicted in relation

to the violation. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3(A)(2), 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78u-1 (2011)).
127. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78u6(a)(6), 78u-6(c)(2)(A), 78u-6(b)(2)(B) (2010)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(2010)). The SEC
rules state that "'[o]riginal information' is information derived from your
independent knowledge (facts known to you that are not derived from publicly
available sources) or independent analysis (evaluation of information that may

be publicly available but which reveals information that is not generally known)
that is not already known by us." OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note
102.
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original source of information. 130 In comparison, the DoddFrank Act proscribes that the information be "derived from
the independent knowledge or analysis . . . not known to the
Commission . . . and is not exclusively derived from . . . [a]
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media."'31
Further, the original information requirement induces the
corporation to self-report violations before the employee,
because the whistleblower's information would no longer be
"original" within the meaning of the Dodd-Frank Act. 13 2
However, when pressed to report first, the company will have
to distinguish information that is worth reporting from that
of mere speculation in a short time period, and risk the threat
of unnecessary government involvement should the report be
unsubstantiated. Since the employee must provide critical
original information to the government before the corporation
informs the government, the act deters employees from
alerting the corporation through internal compliance
programs.
3.

The Certainty of Receiving an Award

The Dodd-Frank Act creates uncertainty by limiting
awards to successful prosecution and basing the payment on
uncertain factors. 1 33 The SEC must prosecute the violator
and limit the whistleblower award to a percentage of the
monetary sanctions "collected" from the particular action. 134
Unlike other similar statutes that derive the whistleblower
award from monetary penalties paid by the violator, the
Dodd-Frank Act established the Securities and Exchange
Commission Investor Protection Fund in the Treasury of the
United States. 135 This Fund pays the whistleblower award
out of the money collected by the Commission in judicial
actions-even if unrelated to the matter on which the award
130. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). The FCA would allow an
individual with information from a third party, to qualify as the "original
source" when they disclose such information to the government. Id.
131. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3)
(2010)). This presumptively would not allow for third-party knowledge, even if
the whistleblower was the original source of the information. Id.
132. LaCroix, supra note 122.
133. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)
(2010)).
134. Id.
135. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g) (2010)).
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is based-and income recovered from the investment of the
Fund. 136 If the amount of the Fund is insufficient to cover the
entire whistleblower award, "there shall be deposited into or
credited to the Fund an amount equal to the unsatisfied
portion of the award from any monetary sanctions collected
by the Commission in the covered judicial
or administrative
137
action on which the award is based."
Therefore, the statutory language implies that the SEC
must collect the monetary sanction prior to completing the
unsatisfied remainder of the award.
Even if the
whistleblower obtained part of the award from the Fund, the
remainder of the award is contingent on the SEC's ability to
recover money from the violator.
While the statutory
language may concern a potential external whistleblower as
to the certainty of the award, the fund currently has $451
million;'38 thus, it is unlikely that whistleblowers will be
concerned that the SEC will not collect the sanction from
violator before awarding the whistleblower. 139
4. Determiningthe Amount of the Award
In determining the amount of an award, it is essential to
provide
the proper balance between
encouraging
whistleblowers to reveal the truth and not giving them an
incentive to falsify a report of fraud. 14° Exorbitant awards
entice whistleblowers to provide information but may also
create false whistleblowers; however, inconsequential awards
will not provide the incentive necessary to encourage
whistleblowers to overcome their fear of retaliation.14 ' "An
informer would have little incentive to give original
information, upon occasions at considerable personal risk, to
officers of the United States if his compensation rested in the
absolute discretion ...[or] in the whim of an [SEC] executive
officer.' ' 42
The Act limits the discretion of the SEC to

determine the amount of the award to 10%-30% of the

136. Id.
137. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(g)(3)(B) (2010)).
138. SEC REPORT, supra note 13.
139. The whistleblower will receive the award directly from the fund until
the $451 million is depleted. See id. at 5.
140. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1151-52.
141. Id.
142. Wilson v. United States, 135 F.2d 1005, 1009 (3d Cir. 1943).
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monetary judgment. 143 The Act also limits the SEC to specific
criteria for determining the exact percentage of the award:
the significance of the information to the judicial action, the
degree of assistance, the interest of the Commission in
deterring violations, and other relevant factors established by
the Commission in rules or regulations.'"
Limiting the
SEC's discretion ensures that the award will be sufficient to
motivate employees to reveal the truth, but not significant
enough to encourage fabricated claims.
5.

Whistleblowers RemainingAnonymous

Prior to blowing the whistle, the whistleblower will
consider whether he can remain anonymous and protect his
relationship with his employer and fellow employees. 4 ' If a
whistleblower's testimony is vital to the success of the action,
the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the
defendant's right to obtain witnesses in his favor and permits
146
the defendant to discover the whistleblower's name.
Generally, a judge may only keep the whistleblower
anonymous when his testimony is not relevant to the
prosecution. 147
Regardless of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right,
many statutes provide whistleblowers with some legal
guarantees of anonymity. 14 8 The Dodd-Frank Act provides
143. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922(a) (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2010)). In comparison, the FCA and the Tax Relief Act
allow for a monetary judgment of 15-30% of the award, while the Insider
Trading Act limits the award to 10%. False Claims Act §3730(d)(1) (2011);
Insider Trading Act, § 21A(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(e)
(2011). The Tax Relief Act also provides a 10% cap for "less substantial
contributions" for information resulting in a hearing.
26 U.S.C. §
7623(b)(2)(2006)).
144. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(c)(1)(B)(i) (2010)). The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the Commission
disregard the balance of the Fund in considering the amount of the award. Id.
The SEC rules claim that they will provide an award if the whistleblower's
information leads to a new investigation, the re-opening of a previously closed
investigation, and the information leads to a successful enforcement action.
OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra note 102.

145. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1157.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(2) (2010)); Insider Trading Act, § 21A(e) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ul(e) (2011). The FCA does not have a provision for anonymity because the
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some assurances of confidentiality, as the Commission
generally will not disclose any information regarding the
whistleblower, including information provided by the
whistleblower that could reveal the whistleblower's
identity. 149
However, the Act limits this protection by
requiring the Commission to provide critical information
about the whistleblower to the defendant during a public
proceeding. 150 Additionally, relevant information provided by
the whistleblower will be disclosed to a limited group of
organizations, even though they are required to keep the
information confidential, in order to protect investors and
accomplish the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act.15 ' Finally,
the whistleblower's identity is not truly anonymous because
the whistleblower will have to disclose his identity in order to
receive payment. 152
Therefore, employees contemplating
whistleblowing under the Dodd-Frank Act will weigh
surrendering their anonymity against the probability of
53
receiving a reward. 1
B. An Analysis of the Dodd-FrankAct RetaliationProvisions
Employees who are aware of valuable information will
not volunteer their knowledge, either internally or externally,
Many statutes include
when they fear retaliation. 54
provisions prohibiting an employer from retaliating against
an employee who engages in lawful behavior, such as
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressed
whistleblowing. 15 5
whistleblower is an identified party to the case. False Claims Act § 3730. In
comparison, the Tax Relief Act protects the whistleblower's identity even after
the conclusion of the trial. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1157.
149. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(2)(A) (2010)).
150. See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1157. What information
qualifies as "critical information" is determined by a judge. See id.
151. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(2)(D) (2010)). The Commission can make any information available to: "(I)
the Attorney General of the United States; (II) an appropriate regulatory
authority; (III) a self-regulatory organization; (IV) a State attorney general in
connection with any criminal investigation; (V) any appropriate State
regulatory authority; (VI) the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;
(VII) a foreign securities authority; and (VIII) a foreign law enforcement
authority. Id.
152. Id. (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(B) (2010)).
153. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6, at 1158.
154. Vaughn, supra note 57, at 2.
155. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a) (codified as
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inadequate whistleblower protections by regulating corporate
for
protections
federal
providing
and
conduct
56
The Dodd-Frank Act also applied a similar
whistleblowers.
provision to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.'5 7
Employees contemplating internal or external whistleblowing
must consider these protections.
1.

Elements of a Retaliation Claim

Under the Dodd-Frank Act an employer cannot
"discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly or
indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the conditions of employment because of any
lawful acts done by the whistleblower." 15' The whistleblower
must have engaged in lawful, protected conduct, by
participating in an SEC action, providing information to the
Commission, or disclosing information under the SarbanesOxley Act or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.159 Prior to
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act protected
employees with a reasonable belief that a violation
occurred. 160 However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not include a
similar qualifier and expands retaliation protections to any
SEC whistleblower-regardless of whether or not the
employee actually believed a violation occurred. 161
To prove that a retaliation action occurred, the plaintiff
must establish the elements of a prima facie case: (1) the
plaintiff was or is an employee of the employer, (2) the
employee engaged in whistleblowing activity protected by
statutory law, (3) the employer had knowledge of the
employee's protected whistleblowing activity, (4) the
employee was terminated or subjected to an adverse
amended at 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a) (2010)); False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(h)(1) (2011).
156. Vaughn, supra note 57, at 2-3.
157. Dodd Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)
(2010)); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(a) (2010)).
158. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A) (2010)).
159. Id. It also protects disclosures under any other SEC law, rule or
regulation. Id.
160. Connie N. Bertram & Lesley A. Pate, Sarbanes-Oxley: A New Whistle
Stop for Whistleblowers, 21 LAB. LAW. 19, 23-24 (2005).
161. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(A) (2010)).
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employment action, and (5) there was a causal connection
between the employee's whistleblowing activity and the
subsequent employment action. 162 The whistleblower must
also have suffered an adverse employment action as a
punishment for his lawful conduct. 163 Adverse employment
actions include: firing, failing to hire, demoting, denying
overtime, disciplinary action, denying benefits, intimidation,
threats, decreased pay, reduced hours, and reassignment to a
position without possible promotion. 164 The employee must
show that his lawful activity was a "contributing factor" to
the adverse employment action. 165 The employer, on the
other hand, may prove by clear and convincing evidence, that
it would have taken the same employment action without
regard to the employee's lawful conduct.166 Courts will also
consider the employee's performance at the corporation, prior
to the retaliation suit, as evidence of the employer's
67
legitimate justification for the adverse employment action. 1
If the employer treated the employee appropriately after
receiving knowledge of the employees claim, the court may
refuse to infer "retaliatory animus" and deny the employee's
8
retaliation claim. 16
2.

Filinga RetaliationClaim

Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the employee must file a
complaint with the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA).' 6 9 If the Secretary of
Labor does not issue a decision within 180 days, the employee
can bring an action in federal district court. 70 The DoddFrank Act eliminates the procedural difficulty involved in
waiting for the Secretary of Labor to issue a decision by
allowing employees to directly file their complaint with the

162. Cavico, supra note 1, at 609.
163. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of the Whistleblower Protection
Program, WHISTLEBLOWERS.GOV,
http://www.whistleblowers.gov/index.html,

(last modified Nov. 10, 2011).
164. Id.
165. Bertram & Pate, supra note 160, at 27.
166. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1057(c)(3)(B).
167. EMPLOYMENT LAw YEARBOOK, supra note 41, at 831.
168. Id. at 835.
169. Bertram & Pate, supra note 160, at 32.
170. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806(a) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (2010)).
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appropriate district court.' 7 1
There are also differences between the Sarbanes-Oxley
statute of limitations and the Dodd-Frank Act.' 72
The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires a retaliation claim be filed
within 180 days of the violation, 173 while the Dodd-Frank Act
provides a unique statute of limitation scheme.17 4 A claim
cannot be filed more than six years after the violation, or
more than three years after the "date when facts material to
the right of action are known or reasonably should have been
known by the employee."175
Even though the employee
cannot bring any claim ten years after the date of the
violation, this statute of limitations provides the employee
with an opportunity to wait longer than provided by the
76
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to report a retaliation claim. 1
Most importantly,
the Dodd-Frank
Act allows
whistleblowers the opportunity to try retaliation claims
before a jury. 177
Congress may have initially intended
Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims to be held before a jury,
but some courts determined that the nature of equitable
claims under Sarbanes-Oxley did not entitle plaintiffs to a
jury trial.178 Since the amendments made by the Dodd-Frank
Act, more employees will likely elect to have their case tried
79
in a federal court to obtain higher compensatory damages. 1
171. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2010).
172. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)); Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)) (2010)).
173. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)); The Dodd-Frank Act modifies the Sarbanes Oxley Act to
include a statute of limitation of 180 days. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(c)(1)(A)(i)
(codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1514(b)(2) (2010)).
174. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2010)).
175. Id.

176. See id. (codified as amended at § 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(1)(1)(B)(iii)(II)
(2010)). See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(b)(2)(D) (2010)).
177. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1514(b)(2)(E) (2010)); R. Scott Oswald & Jason Zuckerman, Whistleblower
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP (July 20, 2010),
http://www.employmentlawgroup.com/Articles/ROswald/DoddFrankWhistleblow
erProvisions.html.
178. Oswald & Zuckerman, supra note 177.
179. Id. (discussing that if plaintiffs do not remove their claim to federal
court, their case will be tried by the Department of Labor Office of
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Remedies Available

Given the uncertainty involved in filing a lawsuit,
employees should consider the other available remedies prior
to proceeding with a retaliation claim. The Dodd-Frank Act
provides a persuasive remedy for whistleblowers suing for
retaliation; successful plaintiffs will receive two times the
amount of back pay owed to them.180 The Dodd-Frank Act
also offers reinstatement, with the same employment status,
costs, witness fees, and
and compensation for litigation
181
fees.
attorney
reasonable
Further, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act included a criminal
penalty provision that imposed substantial fines or up to ten
years in prison for retaliation against any whistleblower who
reported the violation of a federal criminal statute. 182 While
the Dodd-Frank Act does not contain a similar provision, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act includes whistleblowers that report any
Thus, the provision of the
federal statute violation.8 13
Sarbanes-Oxley Act may subject an employer who retaliates
against a whistleblower protected by any federal statute, such
as the Dodd-Frank Act, to criminal sanctions.1 84
The Dodd-Frank Act does not bar plaintiffs from bringing
an action against their employer for breach of contract even if
they have sued for retaliation under whistleblower protection
statutes.1 88 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specifies that retaliation
provisions do not preempt remedies available under state
laws or collective bargaining agreements. 8 6 Under the DoddFrank Act, "rights, privileges, or remedies" provided under

Administrative Law Judges).
180. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(II)(c)(ii) (2010)). The Sarbanes-Oxley only provides back pay with
interest. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(c)(2)(B) (2010)).
181. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(1)(C)(i) (2010)). However, the Dodd-Frank Act lacks the specific statutory
language incorporated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that authorizes any remedy
necessary to "make the employee whole." Id.; Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 1514A(c)(1) (2010)).
182. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 1107(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1513(e) (2010)).
183. See Westman, supra note 43, at 144..
184. Id.
185. See Storey v. Patient First Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 431 (E.D. Va. 2002).
186. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 806(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
1514A(d) (2010))
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state law or under a collective bargaining agreement will not
be diminished by a retaliation claim."8 7
Many collective bargaining agreements contain clauses
requiring an employer to have "just cause" before discharging
an employee, thus eliminating the employer's ability to
retaliate by firing the employee.' 88 Personnel manuals and
policies have also been interpreted to include "just cause"
termination provisions. 8 9 These provisions ensure that there
will be "fair and honest reasons, regulated by good faith on
the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or
capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or
pretextual."' 90
Since the provisions protect activities of
"honest and ethical" behavior, they include a broader range of
conduct with more safeguards than many federal
whistleblower retaliation statutes. 19'
C. Successful Application of Past Whistleblower Acts
The Dodd-Frank Act is not revolutionary in providing
whistleblower incentives, as other statutes such as the FCA,
the Insider Trading Act, the Tax Relief Act, and other federal
programs have provided comparable incentives. 192
The
economic and procedural details of each existing bounty
program demonstrate the factors relevant to the specific
program's success or failure. 193 While there may be some
minor structural differences between the Dodd-Frank Act and
other statutes,'9 4 the success of past provisions can serve as
an indicator of the potential effect of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Since the enactment of the FCA in 1986, the Attorney
187. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(h)(3) (2010)).
188. Joy A. Maulitz, Liability for Wrongful Terminationand Discipline, 4-60
CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAw § 60.05 (2011).
189. Id. at § 60.05(2)(c).
190. Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 93, 108 (Cal. 1998);
King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 426, 438 (2007).
191. Westman, supra note 43, at 152.
192. Ferziger & Currell, supra note 6 at 1201-07. Other such federal
programs include whistleblower incentives for information regarding odometer
tampering under the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
hazardous substance dumping under the Environmental Protection Agency,
ocean dumping under the Coast Guard, the disturbance of marine mammals
under the National Marine Fisheries Services, and the FBI. Id. at 1143-44
n.12. Customs Service laws also provide incentives for violations. Id. at 1144.
193. Id. at 1197.
194. See supra Part III.
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General recovered approximately $24 billion in sanctions that
resulted after whistleblowers provided information leading to
In 2009, the federal
the discovery of false claims.1 95
government recovered $2.4 billion dollars from the FCA;
nearly $2 billion resulted from qui tam actions and $255
million was awarded to qui tam plaintiffs.1 96 While this is a
great indicator of the potential success of a whistleblower
statute, the Dodd-Frank Act is more structurally limited than
the broad language of the FCA. 197
In the twenty years since the implementation of the
Insider Trading Act, only a few whistleblower awards have
been made and the SEC has not received "a large number of
applications from individuals seeking a bounty." 9 8 Until
2010, the SEC had only paid five claimants a total of
$159,537 for information leading to insider trading. 199 But in
2010, prior to the enforcement of the Dodd-Frank Act, the
SEC awarded $1 million to Glen and Karen Kaiser for
information leading to insider trading and the "entry of
injunctions and orders requiring the payment of civil

195. FCA Claims, supra note 123.
196. Id. Qui tam plaintiffs act as whistleblowers when they file a qui tam
action on behalf of the government. Id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, United States Settles False Claims Act
Allegations with Cochlear Americas for $880,000, Release No. 10-673 (June 9,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-civ-673.html
(stating that although the statistics for 2010 are not completed, the United
States recently settled a false claims action for $880,000 after Ms. March
brought a qui tam suit against Cochlear Americas for illegal remuneration to
increase purchases of cochlear implant systems; the government intervened in
2007, pursued civil penalties and received an $880,000 settlement; $176,000 of
which was awarded to Ms. March for her part as a whistleblower).
197. See supra Part III.A and Part III.C.
198. SEC Executive Summary, supra note 33, at 2.
199. Id. at 5. The following is a list of claimants, date of filings and their
respective bounty award: Claimant 1 received $3500 in 1989; Claimant 2
received an award of $18,152 in 2001; Claimant 3 received $29,079 in 2002;
Claimant 4 received three payments totaling $102,640 from 2005 to 2009 for
information leading to three separate insider trading cases; Claimant 5 received
$6166 in 2007. Id. From 1990 to 2004 the SEC denied awards to seven other
bounty applicants; three of which provided sufficient information but were
denied because the statute did not authorize payment when information was
provided prior to the statutes effective date. Id. at 5-6. From 2005 to 2010 the
SEC received approximately thirty bounty applicants; however, the SEC did not
award a single bounty because the SEC did not formally take action to approve
or deny any of the claims and did not notify the bounty applicant accordingly.
Id.
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penalties totaling $10 million. ' 200 An award of $1 million is
the largest award the SEC has ever given to whistleblowers
Excluding the Kaiser
under the Insider Trading Act. 20 '
award, the awards were relatively small and not immensely
enticing; however, the awards were limited at the SEC's
discretion, and the scarce number of awards was attributed20 to
2
deficiencies within the SEC's whistleblower award process.
From 2004 to 2008, the IRS paid over 1000 awards after
recovering more than $760 million, of which more than $72
million was awarded to whistleblowers. °3 These awards took
place when the amount was based on the discretion of the IRS
and could not exceed $10 million.20 4 While the Tax Relief Act
of 2006 added section 7623(b), requiring an award of 15%30% of the monetary judgment, the current success of the new
2 05
amendment is not yet known.
D. Potential Success of the Dodd-FrankAct
According to some analysts, "if the whistleblower
provisions Congress previously provided in other areas are an
accurate indication, the Dodd-Frank Act will dramatically
increase the likelihood that suspected violators of securities
laws will face costly enforcement actions."20 6 Considering the
result of the vast FCA bounty awards, the Dodd-Frank Act
has the potential to provide significant incentives.2 7 The
Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to establish a separate
whistleblower office within the Commission to deal with

200. SEC Awards $1 Million for Information Provided in Insider Trading
Case, SEC v. Pequot Capital Mgmt., Inc., Litig. Release No. 21601, (July 23,
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010ilr21601.htm
[hereinafter SEC Insider Trading].
201. Id.
202. See SEC Executive Summary, supra note 33, at iii.
203. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, ANN. REP. TO

ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623, 10 (2008), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual-report-to-congress-september_20
09.pdf.
204. Id. at 7.
205. Id. at 11. During 2008, the IRS received 476 whistleblower submissions
regarding over 1200 taxpayers that potentially meet the $2 million minimum of
"tax, penalties, additions to tax threshold in section 7623(b)." Id. Of the 994
cases resulting from those submissions, 228 cases involved $10 million and 64
cases involved $100 million of potential recovery. Id.
206. LaCroix, supra note 122.
207. FCA Claims, supra note 123.
CONGRESS
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The office is charged with
whistleblower provisions. 2°s
from the $451 million
awards
to
whistleblowers
distributing
2
°9
While the SEC's Insider Trading
dollars within the Fund.
Act failed to entice and award whistleblowers, the SEC has
shown an increased propensity to reward whistleblowers.21 °
The SEC must ensure that the whistleblower office created by
the Dodd-Frank Act is properly equipped to handle future
whistleblower claims.2 1 1 SEC Commissioner Paredes warned
that the Act would "inundate" the SEC with fraud allegations
and stress SEC resources to their fullest capacity.2 12
Awards under the Dodd-Frank Act have the potential to
be a significant motivator for external whistleblowers. 21 3 For
example, although the Kaisers received a substantial award
under the SEC's Insider Trading Act, they may have received
a larger monetary award under the Dodd-Frank Act.214 Since
Section 21A(e) of the SEC Insider Trading Act applied to the
Kaiser Award, the SEC was only permitted to procure an
award of up to 10% of the recovery. 215 As the judgment
totaled $10 million, the SEC awarded the full 10%, or $1
million.21 6 However, since the Dodd-Frank Act repealed
Section 21A(e), whistleblowers could now receive up to 30% of
the recovery and the Kaisers could have collected $3

208. Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, SEC, Testimony on Implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/201 1/ts02171 lmls.htm.
209. SEC REPORT, supra note 13. The new SEC Office of the Whistleblower
created a website allowing whistleblowers to submit tips online and answering
questions for potential whistleblowers. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, supra
note 102.
210. See SEC Insider Trading, supra note 200.
211. See generally SEC Executive Summary, supra note 33, at 8-19. After
analyzing the SEC's bounty program under the Insider Trading Act, the Office
of Inspector General suggested that the SEC have standardized application
forms, frequent communication with whistleblowers, and a tracking program for
complaints and tips by whistleblowers. Id. These suggestions should be used
for the SEC's new whistleblower office under the Dodd-Frank Act.
212. Amanda Becker, Legal Briefs: SEC Debates Whistleblower Incentives,
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507406.html.
213. See LaCroix, supra note 122.
214. See SEC Insider Trading, supra note 200; Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1376, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(B) (2010)).
215. SEC Insider Trading, supranote 200.
216. Id.
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million.2 17
On the other hand, even after its enactment, the SEC is
having difficulty implementing the Dodd-Frank Act
whistleblower provisions. The SEC announced a plan to
delay the creation of the new whistleblower office required by
the Dodd-Frank Act. 218 Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC's
budget would double from $1.1 billion in 2010 to $2.25 billion
by 2015219; however, the SEC should anticipate a budget
As Republicans
battle with Congressional Republicans.
currently control the House of Representatives, the SEC must
consider that most Republicans oppose the Dodd-Frank Act
and may not be sympathetic with the SEC's funding
demand.2 20 While Democrats defend the need for funding and
the significance of the legislation, which was a momentous
victory for the Obama administration, the Republicans could
22 1
undermine the legislation by cutting the SEC's funding.
Republicans, such as Rick Perry, Mitt Romney, Michele
Bachmann, and Newt Gingrich, all oppose the Dodd-Frank
222
Act for economic reasons and hope to repeal the Act.
Nevertheless, Democratic Representative Barney Frank
claimed that "the GOP and Tea Party [would not] want to go
before their constituents and say they defunded the
regulation" provided by the SEC.22 3 Fortunately, unless
"Republicans capture the presidency and can also muster
[sixty] votes in the Senate, it appears unlikely that DoddFrank will be repealed in full. 224
Until the SEC receives sufficient funding to staff the
whistleblower office, the functions of the office will be

217. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(a) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(b)(1)(B) (2010)).
218. SEC Insider Trading, supra note 200.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Charles Riley, SEC Starved for Reform Funds, CNNMONEY.COM
(January 11, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/01/11/news/economy/
SEC-funding/.
222. Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republicans
Laying Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at B1. Economically, the DoddFrank Act enacted regulations to decrease abusive lending practices and protect
consumers from financial fraud. Id. Republicans claim that these new
regulations negatively effects small business who are "reluctant to take on risk
and expand their operations." Id.
223. Riley, supra note 221.
224. Wyatt, supra note 222.
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delegated to existing staff members.22 5 Budget deficiencies
caused the SEC to ask defendants to travel to the SEC offices
for interviews, take testimony over the phone, or simply
postpone such depositions.2 26 Frank stated that "[tihe lack of
funding means [the SEC] cannot carry out their
responsibilities."2 2 7 Yet, even with the lack of funding, the
SEC has the capability, granted by the Dodd-Frank Act, to
grant an award and use it to make public statements
regarding their tolerance of fraud.
WikiLeaks adds another element of uncertainty to the
potential success of the Dodd-Frank Act. WikiLeaks is a nonprofit media organization that publishes groundbreaking
articles about war, torture, corruption, and corporate
transparency to the public with secure, anonymous,
independent sources.228 WikiLeaks claims that it will never
reveal sources, and the lack of records prevents the
government from seizing valuable information. 229
The
accessibility and guarantee of anonymity provided by
WikiLeaks may create a competitive alternative to reporting
to the SEC under the Dodd-Frank Act to receive
whistleblower protections.23 ° Sherron Watkins, former Vice
President of Enron, engaged in whistleblowing when she
discovered knowledge of accounting violations.2 3' Watkins
claimed she would take her concerns to WikiLeaks now
rather than the Securities and Exchange Commission.23 2
Watkins believes that the SEC is not capable of evaluating
and acting on tips effectively.233 She stated that because
"[t]he label whistleblower is stuck on [her] head," she can no
longer get a job in corporate America.2 34
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Riley, supra note 221.
228. About, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/About.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2011).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Michael Cohn, Enron Whistleblower would go to WikiLeaks Now,
ACCOUNTING TODAY (January 28, 2011), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/
Enron-Whistleblower-WikiLeaks-57078-1.html.
232. Id.
233. Ben Hallman, WikiLeaks More Effective Than SEC, Says Enron
Whistleblower, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (January 28, 2011, 7:28

PM), http://www.publicintegrity.orgblogentry/2871/.
234. Cohn, supra note 231.
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The Inspector General of the Commission will be charged
with the responsibility of conducting a whistleblower
protections study under the Dodd-Frank Act. 235 He must
determine if the whistleblower protection program enacted by
the Dodd-Frank Act is "clearly defined and user-friendly," by
evaluating the public's knowledge of the provision, the
prompt responses by the Commission, and the effect of the
whistleblower award's enticement.2 36 The Inspector General
will provide new insight into the efficiency and effectiveness
of the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower program.2 37 The SEC
will use this information to report to the Congress each
238
year.
IV. EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS FOR CORPORATIONS
RESPONDING TO EXTERNAL INCENTIVES OF THE
DODD-FRANK ACT
Despite some drawbacks and uncertainties concerning
the Dodd-Frank Act, its potential success through the
creation of enticing incentives and significant retaliatory
protections suggests that corporations must remodel their
compliance programs to ensure employees utilize internal
reporting mechanisms. 239 Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, an
effective compliance and ethics program concerns five
essential issues: (1) an environment encouraging an honest
and ethical conduct; (2) accurate and timely disclosures in
reports; (3) the corporation's compliance with laws; (4) the
corporation's internal reporting system, capable of receiving
information about possible reporting or compliance issues;
and (5) holding employees accountable for complying with the
corporation's code of ethics.2 4 ° While the SEC suggests a

235. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922(d)(1).
236. Id.
237. See generally SEC Executive Summary, supra note 33, at i-v.
238. Dodd-Frank Act, § 922(d).
239. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63. Wikileaks also
provides an alternative external reporting mechanism that could threaten the
effectiveness of internal compliance programs; however, since Wikileaks does
not provide monetary compensation, that may entice employees, the DoddFrank Act provides a greater threat to corporate compliance programs. See also
About, WIKILEAKS, http://wikileaks.ch/About.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
240. Corporate Compliance Survey, supra note 20, at 1770 (citing 17 CFR
229.406(b) (2010).
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model "Code of Ethics,"24 ' it does not entice employees to use
internal reporting mechanisms when they can receive a large
monetary award for informing the SEC.24 2
Further, corporations must consider the amended
Sentencing Guidelines to determine what courts will review
when determining the culpability of the corporation in
mitigating or increasing punishment, such as: "(i) the
involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity; (ii) the prior
history of the organization; (iii) the violation of an order; and
(iv) the obstruction of justice."2 4 The Sentencing Guidelines
also express two specific factors that can mitigate the
ultimate punishment of an organization: "(i) the existence of
an effective compliance and ethics program; and (ii)
self2"
responsibility."
of
acceptance
or
cooperation,
reporting,
While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act promoted internal
whistleblowing, critics claim that internal reporting programs
"failed to fully investigate employee complaints, preserve
245
whistleblowers' anonymity, and [proceed] objectively."
Jason Zuckerman, a plaintiffs' attorney, stated that corporate
compliance programs are "window dressings" used to retaliate
against whistleblowers.2 46
While Tim Mazur, the Chief
Operating Officer of the Ethics and Compliance Officer
Association, believes that only approximately 15% of
compliance programs are corrupt.24 7
Corrupt compliance
programs failed to alert corporations such as Enron and
WorldCom of their fraudulent misconduct.24 8 Ms. Eckard, the
GSK whistleblower, 249 used ineffective internal procedures
before externally blowing the whistle under the False Claims
Act. 25 1 While Ms. Eckard claims that she never wanted to
blow the whistle and was only concerned about safety, she
may receive $96 million for her whistleblowing actions. 25 '
241. 17 C.F.R. § 229.406(b) (2010).
242. See Park, supra note 95.
243. Kuca & Myers, supra note 113, at 35.
244. Id.
245. Eggers, supra note 104.
246. SEC Issues Proposed Whistleblower Rules; The Lobbying Continues,
WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 4, 2010, 9:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.comlaw/2010/11/04/
secissuesproposedwhistleblowerrulesthelobbyingcontinues/tab/print
247. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
248. Eggers, supra note 104.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
250. Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at Bll.
251. Peter Loftus, Whistleblower's Long Journey: Glaxo Manager's Discovery
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Considering the direct conflict with Dodd-Frank Act
incentives, corporations can improve their compliance
programs in an effort to increase internal reporting by
offering motivating incentives, ensuring anonymity, and
entrusting compliance officers with independent authority
from corporate counsel.25 2
A. Motivating Incentives
Corporations can motivate employees to report internally
by creating a comfortable environment for internal
253
whistleblowing that inspires loyalty and rewards trust.
Through an effective training program, management can
educate employees on the standards and procedures required
for compliance. 254 An employee should know that honesty
and ethical conduct is important to the corporation.25 5 If the
employer has a strong ethical environment, the employee may
feel that external reporting is disloyal.25 6
Corporations
should reward the American psyche by acknowledging the
whistleblower's loyalty to the corporation.25 7
Most importantly, corporations can discourage loyal
employees from reporting externally by communicating with
employees and addressing complaints promptly.2581
The
corporation must assure the whistleblower that the allegation
is taken seriously, because a whistleblower who knows that
the corporation is pursuing a fair investigation will trust the
compliance process and will not report externally before the
conclusion of the internal investigation.2 59 However, when a
hotline does not record names and contact numbers,
communicating with the employee is difficult; some
compliance programs assign the whistleblower a number and
encourage the whistleblower to call back for an update in
of Plant Lapses in 2002 Led to Her $96 Million Payout, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 28,
2010, at B1. The guilty plea included a $750 million dollar payment. Id.
252. See id.; Jones & Lublin, supra note 97.
253. Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at B1l (statement by Kathleen Edmond,
Chief Ethics Officer, Best Buy Co.).
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A) (2011).
255. Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation
Claims in a Post-Crawford/BurlingtonNorthern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253,
295 (2010).
256. Id.
257. Moberly, supra note 5, at 1143.
258. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 66, at 14-25.
259. Id.
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fourteen days. 260 This is beneficial to both the employee and
the employer, as the whistleblower can stay informed and the
employer can continue to speak with the employee regarding
his allegation of fraud.26 1
Some labor law experts suggest that corporations should
offer financial incentives to persuade employees to use
internal reporting procedures. 262
Any monetary gift a
corporation could afford would be insignificant compared to
the potential federal award. 263 Tim Mazur suggests that
financial incentives will only cause chaos and distrust within
the corporation-eventually leading to false claims.264
Kathleen Edmond, the Chief Ethics Officer at Best Buy,
claims that Best Buy will not offer financial rewards to
internal whistleblowers.266
Instead, Best Buy hopes to
encourage internal reporting mechanisms by recognizing
employees who "do the right thing" and inform the
2 66
corporation first.
B. Whistleblower Anonymity
Corporations have the ability to provide full anonymity to
an employee.2 67 This is a huge incentive because the SEC
cannot offer comparable retaliation protections to an
employee.268
The best way to protect an employee from
retaliation is to ensure anonymity and protect the employee

260. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63. Mazur's office
contains twelve employees and 1200 members who are compliance or ethics
officers. Id. The members of Mazur's association create prophecies of internal
procedures for whistleblowers to report. Id.
261. Id.
262. Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at Bl.
Dan Westman, a labor and
employment lawyer, claims that a company could easily offer small financial
awards, such as $1000 to people who limit their whistleblowing to internal
procedures. Id.
263. Levick, supra note 14.
264. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
265. Jones & Lublin, supra note 97, at Bll. Best Buy recently recognized
and celebrated an internal whistleblower who reported a scheme that cost the
company $41 million dollars in just four years. Id. (statement by Kathleen
Edmond, Chief Ethics Officer, Best Buy Co.).
266. Id.
267. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
268. Id. See also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922(a) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2) (2010)).
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when retaliation occurs.2 69
In fact, some compliance
companies require that their hotlines do not record
whistleblowers names, and instead assign arbitrary numbers
to cases for complete anonymity.2 7 °
Other corporations
prohibit employees from requesting information about the
individual who participated in the fraudulent investigation.2 7 '
If the corporation uses the whistleblower's name, the
corporation should limit the number of people who know it
and provide consequences if the whistleblower's name is
disclosed.27 2 When employees blow the whistle and complain
of retaliation, feedback and immediate action would
demonstrate that retaliation is serious and unacceptable. 273
As the success of any internal reporting procedure will
hinge on the management's ability to reassure employees that
they will be treated with respect, the corporation must act
promptly to discipline any retaliating employee.2 74
If
corporations do not handle retaliation correctly, employees
may become vengeful and will report externally to receive an
award. Since the SEC gives the employee ninety days to
report the complaint to the commission after reporting it to
the board, employees may report on day eighty when they feel
that the corporation has not substantially completed an
investigation or improved the retaliatory conduct. 27 ' Thus
prompt investigatory action, for accusations of both fraud and
retaliation, is essential to the success of the compliance
program.
C. Compliance Officers Independent from CorporateCounsel
It is common practice for the compliance officer to report
to the corporate counsel.2 76 Since the compliance officer is a
269. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
270. Id.
For example, when a compliance officer receives information
regarding a whistleblower tip, he will only receive a case number explaining
that the tip was received through an anonymous hotline or email. Id.
271. KAPLAN & MURPHY, supra note 66, at 14-24.
272. Id. at 14-27.
273. Id. at 14-25.
274. See id. at 14-28 to 14-29.
275. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
276. Leonard Bucklin, More Preaching, Fewer Rules: A Process for the
CorporateLawyer's Maintenance of CorporateEthics, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 887,
890 (2009); see also Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63; JOSA
A. TABUENA, SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS, The Chief
Compliance Officer vs. the General Counsel: Friend or Foe?, 4 (2006), available
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relatively new position in corporations, some corporations
force their general counsel to wear two hats and play the role
of a legal advisor and a compliance officer.27 7 There are some
advantages to this practice, such as simplicity and cost, when
the compliance officer either reports directly to corporate
counsel or the same person fulfills both positions.2 78
However, the general counsel is responsible for legal
compliance under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the
compliance officer should have a separate and independent
function to enforce the administration of the compliance
program. 279 Even the Office of Inspector General expressed
concern when the compliance program created an unequal
balance between the compliance officer and the corporate
counsel. 280
While many compliance officers should go to general
counsel for legal advice when addressing sensitive situations,
the main purpose of the general counsels is to guard the
corporation.2 81 When it comes to deciding what issues to
report to the SEC, the compliance officer and corporate
counsel may disagree.28 2 Thus, the independence of the
compliance officer is essential to ensuring that the
is in compliance with SEC reporting
corporation
requirements.
Instead, compliance officers should report directly to the
CEO or the board of directors. 8 3 Protocols should establish

at http://www.complianceethicsinstitute.org/handouts/2008/conference/tues/601/
Tabuenareprint1206.pdf. Tim Mazur believes that half of the corporations still
have compliance programs that require the compliance officer to report to
corporate counsel. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
277. TABUENA, supra note 276, at 2. There are three different possible
structures a company can implement to create a relationship between legal
responsibility and compliance: one person acts as both the compliance officer
and the general counsel; the compliance officer reports to the general counsel; or
the compliance officer does not report and is independent of the general counsel.
Id.
278. Id. at 4-6.
279. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63; see also TABUENA,
supra note 276, at 2.
280. TABUENA, supra note 276, at 2.

281. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.
282. Id.; TABUENA, supra note 276, at 2. This can occur when the compliance
officer is concerned that an agreement will create violations and corporate
counsel believes the agreement can be arranged with only a slight, insignificant
wrongdoing. Id.
283. Telephone Interview with Tim Mazur, supra note 63.

HeinOnline -- 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 294 2012

2012]

WHISTLEBLOWER TUG-OF-WAR

295

what measures should be taken when the allegation of
misconduct is against the CEO, the general counsel, or the
compliance officer. 2" As the CEO also retains the power to
hire and fire the compliance officer, compliance employment
contracts should contain provisions requiring the approval of
the chairperson of the board of directors before the
compliance officer can be discharged. 8 5 This would provide a
limit to the CEO's control over the compliance officer by
requiring involvement of a third party in the employment
decisions.286
CONCLUSION

Whistleblower incentives are not a novel concept in the
United States; yet, the psychological conflict that inundates a
potential employee with no particular legal knowledge is
overwhelming. If a whistleblower chooses to disregard his
allegiance to the corporation, he faces the difficulty of
interpreting the Dodd-Frank Act and deciding whether he
qualifies for an award. Yet based on past whistleblower
incentives, the Dodd-Frank Act may be an intense motivator
for external whistleblowing. 287 However, there have been no
Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower awards and employees are left
with little guidance as to the scope and requirements of the
act. Further, the employee must consider the risk associated
with disclosing her identity to the SEC and having fewer
compliance
anonymous
corporate
than
protections
programs.28 8 These whistleblower obstacles should not make
a corporation complacent because the Dodd-Frank Act has
sufficient benefits and safeguards to entice an employee to
use its provisions-particularly if the employee is not
comfortable with the internal corporate compliance program.
Corporations can make internal whistleblowing a simple
procedures,
process by implementing straightforward
ensuring confidentiality, rewarding loyalty, and providing an
This
independent, uncorrupted compliance officer.28 9
284. Id.
285. Id. Currently only five percent of ECOA members have contracts with
such provisions. Id.
286. See id.; see also TABUENA, supra note 276, at 2.

287. See supra Part III.C.
288. See supra Part III.A.5. and Part III.B.
289. See supra Part IV.
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Comment suggests that even with the lack of funding, the
SEC's power to award monetary incentives may successfully
entice employees to externally blow the whistle; however,
these incentives can be overcome by promoting an effective
compliance program with greater retaliation provisions.2 90 A
corporation with a good compliance program can reduce the
number of external whistleblowers, increase the use of
internal reporting mechanisms, and capitalize on sentencing
benefits by self-reporting securities law violations.2 91

290. See supra Part III.D. and Part IV.
291. See supra Part -V.
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